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Abstract. The article argues that the macroprudential regulation can be used to the research 
in macroeconomic field as a new methodological tool. The main goal of macroprudential regulation is 
solving the crisis by the mitigation of risks of financial systems as a whole. It was introduced in 
macroeconomics in the late 2000s as an opposition of microprudential regulations. Macroprudential 
regulation is used as a new ingredient to fill the gap between the macroeconomic policy and research 
by analyzing it as a whole. It is generally based on two key elements: First, macroprudential 
methodology strengthens the resilience of the financial system as a whole. Second, it limits a 
system-wide excesses on asset and credit markets. In other words, macroprudential methodology is 
concerned with the stability of the entire financial system, and not of individual institutions.  
The article aims to propose an alternative methodology to the macroeconomic policy making 
and research. This new method, based on macroprudential regulation should allow researchers to 
answer some fundamental questions, like how to identify the market failures for financial crisis 
analysis and which macroprudential regulations should be used to correct them. In the present article, 
the theory of this macroeconomical methodology is being compared with other methods. 
Macroprudential regulation is provided with cross-country analysis, which highlights the practical 
aspects of the implementation. However the author argues that even if other countries experiences are 
interesting to take into account, home country context will define the exact methodology of 
macroprudetial regulation.  
Keywords: macroprudential, macroeconomic methodology, financial analysis, market failure, 
financial stability.  
Introduction. Macroprudential regulation is important for modern economic research. Beside 
general methodology, it uses other specific methods, such as: determining the market failures and 
solution methods of conflicts between monetary and macroprudential policies, delineate 
macroprudential policy and financial stability, etc. This way, macroprudential regulation can be 
presented as an alternative methodology for researching macroeconomic issues.  
This term "macroprudential" was first used in the 1970s to describe a specific solution for 
different crisis in the banking industry. It became particularly popular after the financial crisis of late 
2000s (Clement, 2010). It is aspiring to moderate the risks of the financial system as a whole. It 
mainly aims reducing risks and macroeconomic costs of financial instability. Researches consider it as 
a necessary component between macroeconomic policy and the traditional microprudential regulation 
of financial institutions (Bank of England, 2009). 
The main difference between microprudential and macroprudential methods is their perception 
of risks. For microprudential approach, the risk is taken as exogenous from the financial system, 
meanwhile for the macroprudential method the risk is taken endogenously. Microprudential regulation 
tries to grow the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions, but, in opposite, 
macroprudential view focuses on welfare of the financial system as a whole.  
Before the financial crisis of 2007, banking regulation and supervision were traditionally 
based on a microprudential approach. Regulators were focusing on the needs of individual financial 
institutions, considering the financial system and the economy as a whole as given. The role of 
microprudential regulation was correcting inherent market imperfection by a generic effort to 
guarantee “as much safety as possible” to all banks individually. With the lack of a necessary 
knowledge of the transmission mechanisms in the financial sector and beyond, the micro-regulator and 
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supervisor often focused on books and internal arrangements of individual bank, intervening where needed, 
in the assumption that the rest of the system would remain stable and unaffected by their actions.  
After the crisis of late 2000s the stability of individual financial institutions taken in isolation is not 
enough guarantee for the stability of the whole financial system. Because actions of individual banks can 
harm others through interconnection and contagion effects. In addition, when individual banks cannot 
withstand sector competition they should be allowed to fail - if not, this would be dangerous for the 
efficiency and ultimately the very stability of the system. In this sense the stability of individual financial 
institutions is neither necessary nor sufficient. That said, if the reliability of a Systemically Important 
Financial Institution (SIFI) is at danger, then systemic risk may arise. That is why, the stability of 
systemically relevant financial firms may be necessary to ensure financial stability.  
A macroprudential method of financial stability. Macroprudential policy is generally aimed 
at two different but not mutually exclusive goals. First, macroprudential policy should strengthen the 
resilience of the financial system as a whole. Second, it should limit system-wide excesses on asset 
and credit markets. In other words, macroprudential supervision and regulation is concerned with the 
stability of the entire financial system, and not of individual institutions. 
A main substance of macroprudential approach is monitoring structural systemic risk. This is 
the risk that the default of a single bank – because of its size, market share or interconnectedness – 
could threaten certain functions that are vital for the economy, such as payment transactions or lending 
to the real economy. This is the problem arising from institutions that are “too big (or interconnected) 
to fail” (TBTF). The key objective of policies addressing this risk is to reduce the likelihood of crisis 
at such institutions and the costs to the economy in the event of such a crisis.  
One way out of these risks is to impose progressive capital adequacy requirements. The equity 
capital causes the importance of the banks systemic. When a bank has a big systemic importance, it is 
required to hold more equity capital. If capital adequacy requirements increase in step with systemic 
importance, banks have an incentive to stay smaller and less systemically important. Oppose to this, 
the extra capital at least makes them more resilient. In addition, given that it is impossible to avoid a 
future crisis, measures that improve the resolvability of a distressed Systemically Important Financial 
Institution (SIFI) are important. There are variety of measures, from a mandatory separation of 
financial institutions, e.g. along the lines of the Glass-Steagall Act, to less intrusive rules such as 
requiring banks to ex ante demonstrate that their systemically important functions can be maintained 
in the event of a severe crisis. The TBTF (“too big to fail”) issue is particularly suitable 
in Switzerland. This explains that already in 2011Switzerland adopted a package of measures designed 
in the sense of complementarity. It prescribes a capital surcharge for SIFIs allowing banks to partially 
fulfil capital requirements by means of issuing Contingent Convertible Capital (cocos). The cocos are 
converted exactly at the time when financial means are needed for restructuring a bank, this means 
acting as an internal crisis fund. The package requires banks to show convincingly – on the basis of 
“emergency plans” – that they are organized in a way to be able to maintain systemically important 
functions in the event of a crisis, thus reducing the need for a public bail-out. If they are not able to do 
so, the regulator, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority – FINMA, may impose specific 
organizational measures.  
The second central element of a macroprudential methodology is to directly address the root 
causes of cyclical systemic risk. This element of systemic risk captures the procyclicality of financial 
agents’ behaviour which can cause expansion of the financial cycle and increase its instability if left 
unchecked. This is a classical collective action problem. Procyclicality can arise, for example, from 
the tendency to underprice risk during booms and to overprice it in downswings. The main objective 
here is to limit too much risky behaviour on the part of financial intermediaries, and avoiding 
excessive credit growth, an overvaluation of assets and preventing bubbles from emerging, or at least 
constraining their size. The interest rate comes to mind as a potential instrument. Indeed, raising 
interest rates seems like a natural response to a credit boom, as the higher market borrowing rates exert 
a dampening effect on credit demand and eventually on asset prices. When this calls for deviations 
from otherwise optimal policy, one talks of “leaning against the wind”. In economic growth, it would 
involve central banks setting higher interest rates than would it is necessary to achieve price stability 
alone. In this way, using the interest rate to contain asset price growth would ne regularly lead to 
deviations from the interest rate path that would be optimally justified by the pursuit of the price 
stability mandate.  
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From time to time, price and financial stability assessments may require very different interest 
rate moves, possibly moves in opposite directions. These tensions are illustrations of the well-known 
Tinbergen principle according to which the number of policy tools should equal the number of policy 
goals. These all is necessary to resort to additional instruments to counter the emergence of cyclical 
systemic risk. The most appropriate instruments seem to be directly targeting the source of financial 
exuberance. Regulatory action can be taken to cushion against or hinder the growth of such risks such 
as: imposing a temporary obligation to build-up additional capital, a CCB, as proposed in the Basel III 
framework. In capital requirements this instrument allows for a temporary increase when imbalances 
appear to be building-up in the credit markets with the aim of increasing the capital buffer to absorb 
potential losses and lean against excessive credit growth, at the same time.  
One more possibility to achieve the required countercyclical effect can be the tightening 
restrictions on loan-to-value ratios when signs emerge that a bubble could be forming in certain credit 
markets, such as the mortgage market. The situation is spread in Switzerland since 2011 provides a 
good illustration of the potential tensions between price and financial stability faced by a central bank 
described above. Oposing with extreme safe haven pressures resulting in a massive overvaluation of 
the Swiss franc, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has been enforcing an exchange rate floor of 
CHF 1.20 per euro since September 2011. This policy move was to defeat strong deflationary 
developments, which has invalidated the interest rate as an instrument for dampening the sustained 
momentum observable in the domestic credit and real estate markets over the last few decades. In 
June 2012 the Swiss authorities introduced the CCB against the background of the ensuing imbalances 
and risk to financial stability. It had been activated for the first time in February 2013. Since end of 
September 2013, banks are required to hold additional capital for mortgage loans financing residential 
property located in Switzerland. In short, macroprudential instruments enhance the toolkit available so that 
it is possible to tackle system-wide risks to financial stability more directly and in a preventive manner.  
A macroprudential policy structure should be seen as complementary to a well-designed 
microprudential regulation targeted at assuring the resilience of individual financial institutions and it 
should be conducted alongside a monetary policy that remains firmly focused on price stability. What 
is appealing in theory is not always easy to realize in practice. The use of macroprudential instruments 
have various challenges. First, the use of macroprudential instruments raises significant governance 
issues, originating in the tight and complex interaction of macroprudential policies with monetary and 
microprudential policies. Second, the use of macroprudential instruments is subject to significant 
uncertainties, given the elusiveness of “systemic risk”.  
A great number of instruments of macroprudential regulations are proposed by the researchers, but 
there is no agreement about which one should play the primary role in the implementation of 
macroprudential policy. Most of these instruments are used to prevent the procyclicality of the financial 
system on the asset and liability sides. This tools are “Cap on loan-to-value ratio and loan loss provisions” 
and “Cap on debt-to-income ratio” (Raviv, 2004, Shin, 2011). There are also tools that serve the same 
purpose, but additional specific functions have been attributed to them, as noted below: 
 Countercyclical capital requirement - to avoid excessive balance-sheet shrinkage from 
banks in trouble. 
 Cap on leverage (finance) - to limit asset growth by tying banks' assets to their equity 
(finance). 
 Levy on non-core liabilities - to mitigate pricing distorsions that cause excessive 
asset growth. 
 Time-varying reserve requirement - as a means to control capital flows with prudential 
purposes, especially for emerging economies. 
Other tools serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive short-term debt. They are: 
“Liquidity coverage ratio”, “Liquidity risk charges that penalize short-term funding”, “Capital 
requirement surcharges proportional to size of maturity mismatch”, “Minimum haircut requirements 
on asset-backed securities. In addition to this list, researchers and policy makers propose different 
types of contingent capital instruments, such as "contingent convertibles" and "capital insurance" 
which facilitate bank's recapitalization in a crisis event. 
Identification of market failures selecting instruments. Which are the market failures that 
need macroprudential regulations? To answer this question it is important to make typology of the 
market failures that justify the use of macroprudential policy and whose prevention could constitute its 
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intermediary objectives. For this, policy makers should accurately define the objective of financial 
stability, in order to implement the mandate at the operational level. This approach is based on 
identifying a certain number of market failures that arise during the financial crisis and that require 
different method, such as macroprudential approach to financial regulation. These market failures are: 
excessive credit growth and leverage; excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity; excessive 
exposure concentrations; misaligned incentives for excessive risk-taking and moral hazard; and the 
significant development of OTC derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions to circumvent regulation.  
However, we argue that a new approach should be implemented in these situations in order to 
guarantee the success. The traditional approach of monetary policy is based on Tinbergen’s principle 
and believes that one instrument should be used per objective. New approach suggests using several 
instruments to reach a single financial stability objective. The reason is that the use of macroprudential 
instruments may have unintended consequences for other segments of the financial system or the 
economy. Even though these instruments are already used by microprudential supervisors, their 
effectiveness has not yet been proven from a macroprudential perspective. This sometimes implies a 
countercyclical dimension, meaning these instruments have to be adjusted over time.  
Also, their effectiveness is depending on two other elements of the financial system: first, the 
asymmetric nature of financial cycles, which means that certain instruments have to be adjusted 
asymmetrically over time (for instance, credit institutions have up to twelve months to adjust their 
countercyclical capital buffer to the level specified by the macroprudential authority whereas a release 
of this buffer is immediate); second, the presence of non-linearities, which makes it sub-optimal to 
release the countercyclical buffer when the level of banks’ capital is too low. This would result 
de facto in amplifying the cycle, running counter to the desired effect, whereas its use when capital 
levels are high would maximize the impact on the credit cycle and more generally on economic 
activity. In this context, it important to gain a better understanding of the transmission channels of 
macroprudential policy, which requires having a sound analytical framework, and of its interaction 
with other stabilization policies. 
Conclusions. The macroprudential regulation is a new methodology for the analysis of system 
based crisis. The crisis of the late 2000s showed the limit of previous methods, like microprudential 
regulation. However, the misuse of this new method, can cause even bigger issues. In the conclusion 
of this article, we would like to highlight the major mistake that would make future macroprudential 
policy much harder. The ability of macroprudential authorities to act can be cut quickly in the event of 
a major mistake in this policy area.  
This happened in the case of the Credit Control Act in the United States. Congress in 1969 
gave the President the power to direct the Fed to implement credit controls in the US economy, with a 
very wide grant of authority. This was not used until 1980, when President Carter gave these powers 
to induce the Fed to take strong actions to rein in credit growth, which was seen as contributing to the 
inflationary environment. The economy quickly went into recession and there appeared to be a very 
direct connection between the credit controls and this drop in activity. The economic growth resumed 
when the controls were removed, and this happened with a considerable bounce-back. The disastrous 
use of such a strong set of macroprudential tools made it much harder to attempt future 
macroprudential actions, even of milder and more conventional form 
Since that period global views on how macroprudential policy fits into the larger scheme of 
things have also evolved very considerably. Should authorities make a large mistake in this area, or be 
perceived to have done so, it could halt significant macroprudential policy of a cyclical nature for 
many years. This may be counteracted over time by the successful use of such tools in other countries, 
but home grown lessons tend to have much greater force, especially political force, than lessons 
from abroad. This point is especially important because macroprudential policy is not solidly based in 
political and public support at this point. There is a very strong consensus for monetary policy to be 
undertaken, although there does remain a core of support for a gold standard. Monetary policy 
mistakes are unlikely to lead to the abolition of the Fed. The equivalent cannot be said for 
macroprudential policy. In the conclusion I strongly suggest that we can and should use 
macroprudential policy more actively in the future. We may do so most effectively by heeding the 
lessons of the last century of experimentation in this country. 
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